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1 Introduction
The roles of status in economic growth models have actively been explored. Existing
studies capture the roles of status in terms of sociology, in which status is dened
as one of the components which generate utility (this type of preference is referred
to as status preference). Zou (1994) is one of the pioneering studies concerning this
concept of status. Zou (1994) focuses on the spirit of capitalism, based on Weber
(1958), and assumes that the utility function depends on status, dened as the level
of capital stock holdings, as well as consumption. Under this setting, Zou (1994)
shows that endogenous growth can arise even if the interest rate is smaller than the
time preference rate.1
As for an extension of this stream, the relationship between status and money
has been discussed recently. Specically, recent studies introduce status preference
into a model with a cash-in-advance (CIA henceforth) constraint in order to consider
the channel through which status preference encourages the portfolio substitution |
the shift from money to capital when the ination arises. They examine how status
has an impact on the eect of higher ination (money growth) on the level of capital
stock or on an economic growth rate, which has been one of the important issues
in macroeconomics. Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai (2003) deal with
this issue in a neoclassical framework, while Chang et al. (2000) and Chen and Guo
(2009, 2011) tackle this issue in an AK framework.2 In particular, concerning the AK
model, Chang et al. (2000) employ the Clower-Lucas-type CIA constraint and show
that an endogenous growth rate and money growth are positively correlated. Chen
and Guo (2009) clarify the negative relationship between an endogenous growth rate
and money growth under the Stockman-type CIA constraint, while Chen and Guo
(2011) conrm both positive and negative relationships between them under the
generalized Stockman type.3 4
On the other hand, the roles of status can be also captured in terms of a social
system, in which status can work as credit. From this perspective, Kaminoyama and
1This preference had already been constructed mathematically by Kurz (1968).
2Chang et al. (2000) also consider a neoclassical framework.
3The Clower-Lucas type means that only consumption is constrained by cash, while the Stock-
man type implies that both consumption and investment are constrained by cash. Under the gen-
eralized Stockman-type CIA constraint, consumption and a fraction of investment are constrained
by cash.
4Chang et al. (2000) and Chen and Guo (2009) employ the utility function involving additive
status, while Chen and Guo (2011) consider the utility function involving multiplicative status.
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Kawagishi (2013) construct the \CIA-status constraint," which reects the obser-
vations of the existing studies (e.g., Avery et al. (1987), Wol (1983), Kessler and
Wol (1991), Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1996)).5 Specically, Kaminoyama and
Kawagishi (2013) assume that an agent faces a CIA constraint which binds more
loosely with a rise in the agent's own status, dened as relative income. Thus, the
CIA-status constraint implies that agents with higher income are more creditworthy
and can make purchases with fewer money holdings. Under this framework, unlike
the existing studies which consider the portfolio substitution through status pref-
erence (i.e., in terms of sociology), their study analyzes the portfolio substitution
through the CIA-status constraint (i.e., in terms of a social system).
This study also focuses on the roles of status in terms of a social system, and
conducts the further analysis with the CIA-status constraint under an endogenous
growth model.6 Additionally, we employ the two types of CIA-status constraints |
the Clower-Lucas-type and the Stockman-type CIA-status constraints. We introduce
each CIA-status constraint into a one-sector AK model and examine how status
which aects a CIA constraint has an inuence on the relationship between higher
ination (money growth) and an economic growth rate.7
Under the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint, we show that there exists
a unique balanced-growth-path (BGP henceforth) equilibrium in which the equilib-
rium path is determinate, and that the endogenous growth rate and money growth
are positively correlated. Under the Stockman-type CIA-status constraint, on the
other hand, we also conrm that there exists a unique BGP equilibrium in which the
equilibrium path is determinate. However, the relationship between the endogenous
growth rate and money growth changes from negative to positive when the elasticity
of the CIA constraint with respect to status exceeds one.8 This result is the main
5The observations are summarized as follows: (i) \high income individuals use cash and cash
plus checks for a smaller fraction of their total transactions than low income individuals (Avery et
al. (1987));" (ii) \the fraction of household wealth held in liquid assets decreases with income and
wealth (Wol (1983), Kessler and Wol (1991), Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1996))."
6Kaminoyama and Kawagishi (2013) introduce the CIA-status constraint into a neoclassical
growth model, and examine the eects of money growth on capital accumulation.
7We analyze the existence and the uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium and its stability as well.
8Suen and Yip (2005) analyze a one-sector AK model with the Stockman-type CIA constraint.
Chen and Guo (2008) extend Suen and Yip (2005) by positing that consumption and a fraction of
investment are constrained by cash. These studies assume that the instantaneous utility function
is the constant-intertemporal-elasticity-of-substitution (CIES) type, and show that faster money
growth depresses an endogenous growth rate when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
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nding in the present study.
The brief intuition for the above results is as follows. A higher status makes
the CIA-status constraint less restricted. In the present study, this is referred to as
the status eect, which implies that the agent can recover the loss of the net rate
of return on capital induced by the ination tax eect (note that the ination tax
is caused by a rise in the money growth rate). For instance, if the status eect is
larger than the ination tax eect, then the net rate of return on capital ultimately
rises. In this case, the agent invests more in order to obtain a higher status, so that
capital accumulation is accelerated and the growth rate rises.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the CIA-status constraint
in detail, and provides the basic framework. Section 3 considers the model with the
Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint and analyzes the eects of money growth
on the endogenous growth rate as well as uniqueness and stability of a BGP equi-
librium. In Section 4, this paper constructs the model with the Stockman-type
CIA-status constraint and conducts the same analysis as in Section 3. The conclu-
sion of this paper is presented in Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a continuous-time, innite-horizon, and one-sector growth model with
inelastic labor supply. The size of the population is constant and is normalized to
unity. We employ a simple AK production technology:
y(t) = Ak(t); (1)
where A is a positive constant which reects the level of the technology, y is per
capita output, and k is per capita capital.
2.1 CIA-status constraint
In this subsection, we explain about the CIA-status constraint. This constraint
is formulated based on the assumption that the CIA constraint itself depends on
relative income, which implies status. Note that since the CIA-status constraint
employed in this study is basically along the lines of Kaminoyama and Kawagishi
(2013), the formulation of the CIA-status constraint is almost the same process as
in that existing study.
consumption is small.
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Let us now introduce the ratio of goods which require cash to total goods which
may require cash, and denote this ratio by 
. Taking the observations of the existing
studies into consideration, we assume that 
 depends on the agent's own relative
income, and that 
 lies in the following range along the lines of the standard CIA
model:
0 < 


y
y

< 1; (2)
where y and y are private income and average income in the economy respectively,
and y=y stands for the agent's own relative income. Additionally, we assume that

0

y
y

 0; 
00

y
y

 0: (3)
(3) implies that agents with higher relative income are more creditworthy and can
purchase more cash goods with fewer money holdings.
Since we have assumed that 
() is the ratio of puchased goods which require
cash to total purchased goods which may require cash, we nd that
Gc
G
= 


y
y

; (4)
where Gc and G are puchased goods which require cash in transaction and total
purchased goods which may require cash, respectively. By this denition of Gc, the
following constraint holds:
m  Gc; (5)
where m is real money balances dened as the nominal money balances divided by
the price level.
In Section 3, we consider the Clower-Lucas type, in which Gc and G are denoted
as follows:
Gc = cc; G = c; (6)
where cc is consumption of cash goods and c is total consumption. Thus, it follows
from (4), (5) and (6) that
m  


y
y

c: (7)
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On the other hand, in Section 4, we focus on the Stockman type, in which Gc and
G are represented by
Gc = cc + ic; G = c+ i; (8)
where ic is investment in cash goods and i is total investment (cc and c are the same
denitions as in the Clower-Lucas type). Hence, it follows from (4), (5) and (8) that
m  


y
y

(c+ i): (9)
Under the AK production technology, (7) and (9) are respectively expressed as
follows:
m  


k
k

c; (10)
m  


k
k

(c+ i); (11)
where k is the average level of capital in the economy. In this paper, therefore, (10)
and (11) are referred to as the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint and the
Stockman-type CIA-status constraint, respectively.
2.2 Other settings
The representative agent maximizes its lifetime utilityZ 1
0
c(t)1    1
1   e
 tdt;   1; (12)
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  is the rate
of time preference. The overwhelming preponderance of empirical evidence suggests
that 1= is relatively small, so that we assume that   1.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is
_m(t) = Ak(t)  c(t)  i(t)  (t)m(t) + (t); (13)
where i is investment and  is the rate of ination. In addition,  is the seigniorage
that the agent receives from the monetary authority as a lump-sum transfer:
(t) = m(t); (14)
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where  is the constant, time-invariant money growth rate. By using , the nominal
money supply, M , is expressed as
M(t) =M(0)et; given M(0) > 0: (15)
The law of motion of the capital stock is given by
_k(t) = i(t): (16)
For simplicity, the depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be zero.
Finally, in what follows, we assume that
A   > 0: (17)
This is the standard assumption in the studies on an AK model. We assume that the
CIA-status constraint is binding in equilibrium, as is common in the CIA literature.9
3 Clower-Lucas type
3.1 Optimal conditions and dynamic system
In the case of the Clower-Lucas type, the representative agent's maximization prob-
lem is as follows:
max
Z 1
0
c(t)1    1
1   e
 tdt;
s:t: _m(t) = Ak(t)  c(t)  i(t)  (t)m(t) + (t) ; given k(0) > 0;
_k(t) = i(t);
m(t) = 


k(t)
k(t)

c(t):
In this problem, the representative agent is assumed to take the sequences, fk(t)g1t=0,
as given. In what follows, we drop time index from the endogenous variables. To
derive the necessary conditions for an optimum, we set up the current-value Hamil-
tonian function:
H =
c1    1
1   + 

Ak   c  i  m+ +  i +  m  
kk

c

;
9In our model, the inequality,  > A, is the sucient condition under which the CIA-status
constraint is binding in equilibrium. In addition, note that  > A ensures  > 0.
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where  and  are the shadow prices associated with m and k, respectively, and  is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the CIA-status constraint. The rst-order
conditions are
c       


k
k

= 0; (18a)
  +  = 0; (18b)
A+ _      
0

k
k

c
k
= 0; (18c)
   + _   +  = 0: (18d)
Furthermore, the transversality conditions are
lim
t!1 e
 tk = 0; (19a)
lim
t!1 e
 tm = 0: (19b)
(18a) equates the marginal benet to the marginal cost of consumption. (18b) and
(18c) govern the evolution of physical capital over time, where the standard Euler
equation of the representative agent is modied to reect status which aects a CIA
constraint. (18d) implies that the marginal values of real money holdings are equal
to their marginal costs.
Since it is assumed that the total size of population is constant and normalized
to unity, the following conditions hold in equilibrium:
k = k: (20)
Additionally, in equilibrium, the goods market clears, and money demand is equal
to money supply:
_k = Ak   c; (21)
_m = (  )m: (22)
We assume that the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint is binding in equilib-
rium, as is common in the CIA literature. Thus, from (10) and (20), we obtain
m = 
(1) c: (23)
We here introduce  and  , which are dened as
  c
k
;   

:
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From these denitions, (18a)-(19b), and (20)-(23), we obtain the following dynamic
system after some manipulation:10
_

=

1  
0(1) 	   + ; (24)
_ 
 
=


(1) 1  1 + 1
	
(   1)

  _

 A

+ (     )

: (25)
3.2 BGP equilibrium and stability
We rst examine the existence and the uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium. Note that
(17) ensures that the BGP equilibrium value of  is in (0; A), so that the endogenous
growth rate is positive.
The _ = 0 locus and the _ = 0 locus are respectively given by11
 =
   
1  
0(1) ; (26a)
 =

1
1  

   + 
1   +A+
_

: (26b)
Moreover, the _ = _ = 0 locus is
 =

1
1  

   + 
1   +A: (27)
The intersection between (26a) and (27) gives a BGP equilibrium.
The _ = 0 locus (26a) is monotonically increasing in  , while the _ = _ = 0
locus (27) is monotonically decreasing in  since   1.12 Thus, there exists a unique
BGP equilibrium under (17). Furthermore, from Appendix A.1 and Fig. 1, we see
that the BGP equilibrium is a source. Hence, the equilibrium path is determinate
because  and  are jumpable variables.
Proposition 1. In the AK model with the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status con-
straint, there exists a unique BGP equilibrium in which the equilibrium path is de-
terminate.
(Insert Fig. 1 here.)
10The ination rate () is endogenously determined:  =  A+  1 + 
0 (1)	.
11Regarding the shapes of the _ = 0 locus and the _ = 0 locus and the dynamics of  and  , see
Appendix A.1.
12When  = 1, the _ = _ = 0 locus is given by  = + .
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3.3 Eects of money growth
Let us denote the BGP equilibrium value of  by . From (13), (14), (20), and
(22), the endogenous growth rate g is
g = A  : (28)
As mentioned in Section 3.2, (17) ensures that  is in (0; A), so that g > 0. In
what follows, we rst derive . Then, we examine the eect of money growth on
the endogenous growth rate.
Eliminating  from (26a) and (27), we have
X2 + Y + Z = 0; (29)
where
X  
0(1)(1  ) > 0;
Y    +
0(1)+    (1  )A	 < 0;
Z     (1  )A > 0:
Here, we dene D as the discriminant of the equation (29). Under   1, it follows
that
D  Y 2   4XZ > 0: (30)
Solving (29), we obtain13
 =   Y +
p
D
2
0(1)(1  ) > 0: (31)
Thus, the relationship between the endogenous growth rate and money growth is
dg
d
=  D  12
0(1) > 0: (32)
Proposition 2. In the AK model with the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status con-
straint, the endogenous growth rate and money growth are positively correlated.
13The equation (29) has two positive solutions. However, the larger solution is not valid because
this solution makes the value of   minus.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that the economy is in a BGP
equilibrium initially, and that the money growth rate rises. This leads to a rise in
the ination rate, so that the demand for current consumption declines through the
CIA constraint. Furthermore, the agent knows that capital accumulation causes
a higher status, which makes the CIA constraint less restricted. This provides
incentives to invest in capital, because accumulating capital enables the agent to
increase future consumption through the CIA constraint. Thus, since the agent
shifts his/her demand from current consumption to capital, the endogenous growth
rate rises.
4 Stockman type
4.1 Optimal conditions and dynamic system
In the case of the Stockman type, the representative agent's maximization problem
is expressed as follows:
max
Z 1
0
c(t)1    1
1   e
 tdt;
s:t: _m(t) = Ak(t)  c(t)  i(t)  (t)m(t) + (t) ; given k(0) > 0;
_k(t) = i(t);
m(t) = 


k(t)
k(t)
 
c(t) + i(t)

:
As mentioned in the Clower-Lucas type, the representative agent is assumed to
take the sequences, fk(t)g1t=0, as given. To derive the necessary conditions for an
optimum, we set up the current-value Hamiltonian function (in what follows, we
drop time index from the endogenous variables):
H =
c1    1
1   + 

Ak   c  i  m+ +  i +  m  
kk

(c+ i)

;
where  and  are the shadow prices associated with m and k, respectively, and  is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the CIA-status constraint. The rst-order
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conditions are given as follows:
c       


k
k

= 0; (33a)
  +    


k
k

= 0; (33b)
A+ _      
0

k
k

1
k
(c+ i) = 0; (33c)
   + _   +  = 0: (33d)
Moreover, the transversality conditions are
lim
t!1 e
 tk = 0; (34a)
lim
t!1 e
 tm = 0: (34b)
(33a) equates the marginal benet to the marginal cost of consumption. (33b) and
(33c) govern the evolution of physical capital over time, where the standard Euler
equation of the representative agent is modied to reect status which aects a CIA
constraint. (33d) implies that the marginal values of real money holdings are equal
to their marginal costs.
As in the preceding section, (20), (21), and (22) hold in equilibrium. We assume
that the CIA constraint is binding in equilibrium, as is common in CIA literature.
Thus, it follows from (11) and (20) that
m = 
(1) (c+ i): (35)
In addition, from (33a)-(33c), the Euler equation is given by
_c
c
=
1


A(1  )


 1
+A   

 g; (36)
where
   

0(1)

(1)
> 0:
Note that  expresses the elasticity of the CIA constraint with respect to status.
Along the BGP, c, k, and m grow at a common constant rate g, and the costate
variables grow at a common rate. To derive the dynamic system and the BGP
equilibrium, we introduce  and !, which are dened as
  c
k
; !  

:
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Deriving the dynamic system, we have14
_

=
A(1  )

! 1 +   1

fA(   ) + g ; (37a)
_!
!
=
1

(1)
!  A(1  )! 1   +

(1  )A    1

(1)

: (37b)
4.2 Domain of !
In the model with the Stockman-type CIA-status constraint, we need to consider
the domain of ! in terms of the restriction on  and the endogenous growth rate.
From (33b),  is given by
 =
  

(1)
: (38)
Since  > 0 in a BGP equilibrium, it follows from (38) that  > .15 Thus, the
following condition needs to hold:
! > 1: (39)
Furthermore, in order to ensure that the endogenous growth rate is positive (see
(36)), we assume that
! <
A  A
A    if  <

A
; (40a)
! >
A  A
A    if  

A
: (40b)
As a consequence, it follows from (39), (40a) and (40b) that the domain of ! is
given as follows:
1 < ! <
A  A
A    if  <

A
; (41a)
1 < ! if   
A
: (41b)
Note that (17) enables us to consider the case where  = 0 (i.e., the framework of
Suen and Yip (2005)).
14Using (16), (20), (21), (22), and , we obtain the following ination rate:  =  A+ .
15If the Lagrange multiplier associated with (11), , is zero, then the CIA-status constraint is not
binding.
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4.3 BGP equilibrium and stability
In a BGP equilibrium, _ = 0 and _! = 0 are satised. Hence, from (37a) and (37b),
the following expressions hold:
 =  A(1  )

! 1 +
1

fA(   ) + g ; (42a)
 =
1

(1)
!  A(1  )! 1 +

(1  )A    1

(1)

: (42b)
(42a) is the _ = 0 locus, and (42b) is the _! = 0 locus. Here, regarding the _ = 0
locus (42a), the upper (resp. lower) bound exists when  < 1 (resp. when  > 1). In
order to ensure that a BGP equilibrium exists, we assume that the upper or lower
bound of the _ = 0 locus is positive. This assumption is equivalent to the following
inequality:
 <  +

A
: (43)
Note that the right-hand side of (43) is greater than one since   1.
We now focus on the BGP equilibrium value of !. Using (42a) and (42b) and
eliminating , we have
 (!)  1

(1)
!2 +

A

1

  1

 

+
1

(1)
+



! +A(1  )

1

  1

= 0:
(44)
Since we assume that   1, it follows that
 (1) =
A  

  (A+ )  A     (A+ ) =  (+ ) < 0: (45)
Thus, we nd that the equation (44) ( (!) = 0) has two dierent real roots such
that one solution is greater than one and another solution is less than one. Since
a BGP equilibrium value of ! needs to satisfy at least (39), we see that the larger
solution of the equation (44) may be valid as the BGP equilibrium value of !. In
what follows, let us denote this larger solution by !:16
! =

(1)
2
"
 B +

B2   4A

(1)
(1  )

1

  1
 1
2
#
; (46)
16In order for a BGP equilibrium to satisfy the transversality conditions, the rate of money supply,
, must have the following upper bound:
 <
!   1

(1)
:
Note that this condition is always satised under   1 (see Appendix A.2).
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where
B  A

1

  1

 

+
1

(1)
+



< 0:
As explained in Section 4.2, the domain of ! is dierent depending on the value
of . Because of this, we examine the existence and the uniqueness of a BGP
equilibrium in both the case where  < A and the case where   A .
When  < A
In order for ! to be the BGP equilibrium value of !, the following inequality must
be satised:
! <
A  A
A    : (47)
Here, (47) always holds under the following inequality:

A
<
1

(1)
+ 1
(1) + 
: (48)
Thus, if (48) holds, then ! becomes the BGP equilibrium value of !. Moreover,
substituting ! into (42a) or (42b) yields the BGP equilibrium value of , denoted
by . Therefore, there exists the unique BGP equilibrium (!; ) under (48).17
When   A
In this case, under (17) and (43), ! becomes the BGP equilibrium value of !.
Furthermore, substituting ! into (42a) or (42b) yields . Thus, there exists the
unique BGP equilibrium (!; ) under (17) and (43).
Let us move on to the stability of the unique BGP equilibrium (!; ). The
phase diagram is illustrated in Fig. 2 (when  < 1) and Fig. 3 (when  > 1).18
Therefore, in the unique BGP equilibrium (!; ), the equilibrium path is determi-
nate because ! and  are jumpable variables.
Proposition 3. In the one-sector AK model with the Stockman-type CIA-status
constraint, there exists a unique BGP equilibrium, in which the equilibrium path is
determinate.
17Note that (17) automatically holds under (48), and that (43) always holds when  < 
A
.
18See Appendix A.3 for the derivation of the phase diagram, and note that Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are
examples.
15
(Insert Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 here.)
4.4 Eects of money growth
4.4.1 The relationship between g and 
We analyze the eects of money growth on the endogenous growth rate. Dierenti-
ating (36) with respect to , we obtain
dg
d
=  A(1  )
!
1p
D!()
: (49)
Here, D!() is the discriminant of the equation  (!) = 0:
D!()  12   2 + 3; (50)
where
1  A2

1

  1
2
; 2  2A

1

  1

  1

(1)
+



;
3 

+
1

(1)
+


2
  4A

(1)

1

  1

:
Since (45) holds, we see thatD!() is always positive. Taking (49) into consideration,
we are able to summarize the relationship between the endogenous growth rate and
money growth as follows:
dg
d
=  A(1  )
!
1p
D!()
< 0 if  < 1; (51)
dg
d
= 0 if  = 1; (52)
dg
d
=  A(1  )
!
1p
D!()
> 0 if  > 1: (53)
We conrm that (51) is the same result as in Suen and Yip (2005). In addi-
tion to this result, however, (52) and (53) are also obtained in our model. From
(51) through (53), the relationship between the endogenous growth rate and money
growth changes from negative to positive when the elasticity of the CIA constraint
with respect to status, , exceeds one.
Proposition 4. In the one-sector AK model with the Stockman-type CIA-status
constraint, the endogenous growth rate and money growth are negatively correlated
when  < 1, while they are positively correlated when  > 1. The superneutrality of
money holds when  = 1.
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4.4.2 Intuition
We can rewrite dg=d as follows:
dg
d
=
dg
d
d
d!
d!
d
=  d

d!
d!
d
: (54)
Suppose that the economy is in a BGP equilibrium at the initial date, and that the
money growth rate, , rises.
We rst consider the term d!=d in (54). Concerning this term, from (46), we
nd that the following expression holds:
d!
d
=
!p
D!()
> 0: (55)
This implies that the representative agent switches a part of real money balances
into capital holdings when a higher ination occurs, so that the shadow price of
capital becomes relatively higher than that of real money balances.19
We next focus on the term d=d! in (54). From (42a), this term is represented
by
d
d!
=
1
!

A
!
   A
!

: (56)
The rst term in parentheses on the right-hand side of (56), A=!, captures the
ination tax eect caused by a rise in the money growth rate, . This is because
the rise in  raises !, so that the net rate of return on capital, A=!, falls. On the
other hand, the second term in parentheses on the right-hand side of (56), (A=!),
represents the status eect in our model. The reason for this is given as follows.
19The term d!=d is represented by
d!
d
=

(1)
1 +A(1  ) 
(1) 
!
2| {z }
PSE
 A(1  ) 
(1)

 
!
2| {z }
ISE
:
The meanings of PSE and ISE are according to Chen and Guo (2008). The PSE (the portfolio
substitution eect) means that a higher ination causes the representative agent to switch a part
of real money balances into capital holdings, while the ISE (the intertemporal substitution eect)
implies that a rise in the money growth rate induces the representative agent to consume less and
invest more in exchange for higher future consumption. In the present study, we assume that   1,
so that the PSE dominates the ISE.
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The agent can make the CIA constraint less restricted by enhancing his/her status,
so that the agent can increase consumption. This process implies that the agent
can recover the loss of the net rate of return on capital induced by the ination tax
eect.
Taking into account the above explanation, we consider dg=d. Note that the
rise in  raises ! under   1, and that the sign of d=d! depends on the value
of .
When  < 1
The ination tax eect is larger than the status eect. Thus, since the net rate
of return on capital ultimately falls, the agent decreases investment and increases
current consumption. This leads to a rise in (= c=k) (this process is consistent
with d=d! > 0). Therefore, capital accumulation is depressed, so that the growth
rate falls.
When  = 1
The ination tax eect is equal to the status eect, so that the agent does not change
his/her behavior. Thus, the growth rate does not change as well.
When  > 1
The status eect is larger than the ination tax eect. Thus, since the net rate
of return on capital ultimately rises through the status eect, the agent increases
investment and decreases current consumption in order to enhance his/her status.
This leads to a fall in (= c=k) (this process is consistent with d=d! < 0).
Therefore, capital accumulation is accelerated and the growth rate rises.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have captured the roles of status in terms of a social system and
have conducted the analysis with the CIA-status constraint, which implies that
agents with higher income are more creditworthy and can make purchases with
fewer money holdings. Specically, we have introduced the CIA-status constraint
into a one-sector AK model, and have examined how status, which aects the CIA
constraint, has an impact on the relationship between the endogenous growth rate
and money growth.
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Under the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint, we have shown that the
endogenous growth rate and money growth are positively correlated. This is the
same result as in Chang et al. (2000). On the other hand, under the Stockman-type
CIA-status constraint, we have conrmed that both the positive and negative eects
of money growth on the endogenous growth rate arise depending only on the degree
of the elasticity of the CIA constraint with respect to status. More specically, the
relationship between the endogenous growth rate and money growth changes from
negative to positive when the elasticity of the CIA constraint with respect to status
exceeds one.
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Appendix
A.1. _ = 0 locus and _ = 0 locus in the Clower-Lucas-type model
As for the shape of _ = 0, we nd that
d
d 
> 0;
d2
d 2
< 0:
The dynamics of  become
_ > 0 above _ = 0 locus;
_ < 0 below _ = 0 locus:
On the other hand, concerning the shape of _ = 0, we see that
d
d 
> 0;
d2
d 2
< 0 (*   1):
The dynamics of  are as follows:
_ > 0 below _ = 0 locus;
_ < 0 above _ = 0 locus (*   1):
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A.2. Transversality conditions in the Stockman-type model
In order to ensure that the transversality conditions are satised in a BGP equi-
librium, the following condition needs to hold:
 <
!   1

(1)
:
This condition is equivalent to
A

1

  1

 + +
1

(1)
  

<
p
D!(): (57)
Here, the following inequality always holds:
A

1

  1

 + +
1

(1)
  

< A

1

  1

 + +
1

(1)
+


 : (58)
From (50), under   1, we nd that
2 < 2   4A

1

  1

+



   4A

(1)

1

  1

= D!(): (59)
When  > 0, from (59), we obtain
 <
p
D!(): (60)
When   0, on the other hand, (60) automatically holds. Therefore, from (58)
and (60), we nd that (57) always holds, that is, the transversality conditions are
always satised under   1.
A.3. _ = 0 locus and the _! = 0 locus in the Stockman-type model
The shape of the _ = 0 locus is as follows:
d
d!
> 0 ;
d2
d!2
< 0 if  < 1;
d
d!
< 0 ;
d2
d!2
> 0 if  > 1:
As for the dynamics of , we see that
_ > 0 above _ = 0 locus;
_ < 0 below _ = 0 locus:
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On the other hand, the shape of the _! = 0 locus is given by
d
d!
> 0 ;
d2
d!2
< 0 if  < 1;
d
d!
Q 0 ; d
2
d!2
> 0 if  > 1:
Concerning the dynamics of !, we conrm that
_! > 0 below _! = 0 locus;
_! < 0 above _! = 0 locus:
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Fig. 1. Phase diagram under the Clower-Lucas-type CIA-status constraint
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Fig. 2. Phase diagram under the Stockman-type CIA-status constraint when  < 1
23
χ˙ = 0
ω˙ = 0
ω
χ
O ω∗
χ∗
1
Fig. 3. Phase diagram under the Stockman-type CIA-status constraint when  > 1
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